Accounting for Externalities > English > Freedom in a World with Limits

Imagine a bridge crossing a deep ravine. Its deck is wide enough to walk across comfortably, and guardrails run along both sides. Remove the rails. A pedestrian can now step in directions that were physically blocked before, including straight over the edge. Has freedom increased? For someone afraid of heights, the crossing may have become impossible. A child has lost a protection that allowed a parent to let go of a hand. The bridge offers more unimpeded movement at its edges, while becoming less usable as a way to reach the other side.

I use this image to distinguish permission from an effective capacity to act. Erich Fromm approached a related problem through freedom from external bonds and the positive freedom to develop one's own powers in a relationship with the world. Liberation from an imposed position could bring independence while also producing isolation and anxiety. Without conditions for an active, independent life, people could seek relief by submitting to a new authority. 1 The bridge illustration carries that question into economic life: which arrangements help people use their freedom, and which merely look restrictive when their supporting role is forgotten?

Removing a rule sometimes opens real possibilities. A restriction can protect an established interest or prevent useful experimentation. A barrier across the bridge's entrance would be a different arrangement from a rail along its edge, even if both were defended with the same word, safety. We must examine what a restriction enables and whom it excludes. Other constraints express dependencies that persist when the rule disappears. A resource consumed faster than it returns leaves less available for later users. The immediate user gains an opportunity while someone else's range of action contracts. We should ask about both lives before describing the change as an unqualified expansion of liberty.

The starting point is the person missing from an exchange. Buyer and seller can agree without including everyone affected by the resource withdrawal or waste associated with their bargain. Some absent people live elsewhere; others have not been born. The participants' consent establishes their agreement, but cannot establish that everyone concerned has accepted the consequences. A cost can remain outside the bargain, even when both parties acted willingly and complied with the rules applying to them. 2

This creates an ethical choice before it creates a measurement problem. We include humanity across places and generations in the community whose continuing possibilities matter. Maintaining natural and social capital follows from that commitment.

Thermodynamics helps explain why resources deteriorate and what restoration requires. It cannot confer rights on a future person. We choose to recognise those rights, then seek an economic arrangement consistent with the choice. Stating that order makes the responsibility ours rather than attributing it to an impersonal command.

Natural limits do give consequences to our decisions. They do not appoint a government or select its constitution. People must still decide how needs should be met and burdens shared. Scientific evidence can reveal that a withdrawal is unsustainable without settling who should reduce it first. Presenting a disputed allocation as the unavoidable verdict of nature would conceal a political decision. The people making it must explain their reasoning and remain answerable for the power they exercise.

A complementary measure can help that deliberation. We place the effort required to maintain shared capital alongside ordinary market value. An apparently inexpensive activity can then reveal an obligation omitted from its price. People retain choices among production methods and uses. They receive a fuller account of what those choices require if comparable opportunities are to remain available. The measure supplies information for responsibility; the ethical commitment gives us a reason to act on it.

Consider someone using a concentrated natural stock. Earlier processes made the resource available without requiring that person to reproduce their work. Consuming it can deliver a present benefit. If the associated productive potential is allowed to disappear, later users must secure an alternative or accept diminished possibilities. The present decision therefore reaches into their freedom. I see no reason why ownership today should automatically confer an unlimited entitlement to determine what tomorrow's users can inherit.

Equal concern does not make everyone's situation identical. An essential use differs from one that can readily be avoided. Some people inherit abundant alternatives; others depend on a single source. A common account can reveal resource demands while leaving these differences for public judgement. Applying the same price pressure without considering access to alternatives can distribute freedom according to existing wealth. The preservation objective must remain connected to the people for whose sake capacity is being maintained.

Nor should we dictate future preferences. Later generations may want services and technologies we cannot imagine. Preserving productive potential leaves them means with which to pursue their own purposes. It does not require them to repeat our particular economy. This matters when choosing a reference condition: our responsibility concerns the capabilities we hand on, including usable knowledge and natural resources, rather than a complete plan for how our successors must live.

Power over measurement can itself threaten freedom. An institution able to attach obligations to transactions would affect livelihoods through its valuation rules. A favourable exception could enrich one group at another's expense. People therefore need access to the assumptions and a means of challenging an estimate. They must also be able to question the use made of an accurate estimate. Knowing that a cost exists does not settle which authority may collect it or how the proceeds should be used.

Education supports consent when it gives people the means to examine a shared problem. It fails that purpose if it becomes instruction in accepting a finished answer. The reasons for preservation should be intelligible enough for disagreement to become productive. An objection may reveal an unfair burden or a missing alternative. Taking it seriously can improve the policy while preserving the common objective. Dissent cannot automatically be treated as ignorance by whoever happens to administer the measure.

Delay also affects liberty. If we consume the available room for adjustment, later decisions can become harsher and more urgent. Acting while alternatives exist gives society time to develop workable methods and negotiate their distribution. Anticipation offers a practical defence of choice, alongside the ethical defence of people absent today. We do not need perfect certainty before recognising the value of retaining options; we do need evidence and public justification for the particular measures used to retain them.

Like guardrails that make a bridge usable for more people, justified economic limits should protect the conditions of choice while leaving those who cross free to choose their destination.

References

1. Fromm, E. (1941). Escape from freedom. Farrar & Rinehart.

2. Lascols, B. (2026). Capital and entropy: Theory of negentropic value (4th ed.). Accounting for externalities.