Accounting for Externalities > Economic_theory > What a Price Leaves Out

In a cannon workshop in Bavaria, a blunt boring tool kept producing heat as it rubbed against metal. Count Rumford investigated the process in 1798. Water surrounding the apparatus could be brought to the boil while the machinery continued turning. If heat were a conserved fluid stored inside the metal, where was this apparently inexhaustible supply coming from? Rumford’s experiment made the difficulty concrete: sustained mechanical work could sustain the production of heat. 1

The caloric theory treated heat as an imponderable substance passing between bodies. Mechanics dealt with motion and forces. Keeping the two accounts separate left friction troublesome: mechanical work seemed to disappear while heat appeared. Joule later measured the relationship using falling weights to drive paddles through water. The temperature rose in a reproducible relation to the work supplied. Heat and work needed a common account of energy transfer; merely patching the boundary between their theories could not explain their quantitative equivalence. 2

I see a related difficulty in our economic accounts. An exchange can be profitable while the resources supporting it deteriorate. We record the receipts and payments between the participants, then handle damage outside their agreement through separate remedies. These remedies can be useful, yet the division leaves a persistent question: what has happened to the wealth that made production possible?

Adam Smith understood that an ordinary product embodies extensive cooperation. His account of a labourer’s woollen coat follows the contributions of people who never meet its wearer. Division of labour makes this cooperation productive. Smith also distinguished usefulness from purchasing power and explored labour as a measure of exchangeable value. His explanation was more varied than a claim that every market price equals the hours spent making something: wages, profit and rent enter his account of developed societies. The central idea is the connection he draws between consumption and the productive arrangements preceding it. 4

Ricardo sharpened the question of relative value. For reproducible goods, he gave a central role to the labour required for production, including labour embodied in equipment. He recognised exceptions for scarce objects whose supply could not readily increase. His argument kept the sale connected with the conditions of production. That perspective remains valuable even where labour alone cannot explain the differences we need to measure. A resource’s useful concentration, for example, may have arisen through natural processes that nobody was paid to perform. 5

Jevons shifted attention to the usefulness of an additional quantity. A person’s willingness to acquire another unit changes with existing supplies and competing needs. Past expenditure cannot compel someone to value an unwanted object. This is a powerful explanation of exchange, and it helps us understand why identical goods can sell for different prices. Jevons did not dispense with production: costs affect supply, which affects the marginal usefulness of what remains available. The change lies in how demand and available quantities enter the explanation of value. 6

We need that explanation. People have different purposes, and prices allow them to compare alternatives without first agreeing on a common way of life. The main objection concerns the task we ask prices to perform 3. The amount accepted by a buyer and seller does not necessarily measure the productive capacity their transaction consumes. An affected neighbour may have no place in the negotiation. Someone born decades later cannot express a purchasing preference today. Their absence leaves costs unpaid even when the sale itself is voluntary.

Imagine two manufacturers selling equivalent cooking pots. One pays to recover metal from discarded equipment. The other obtains fresh metal while leaving some damage around the mine untreated. We cannot decide which method is preferable from this description alone: recovery also requires energy and machinery. We can say that their retail prices will give a misleading comparison if only one producer must account for its effects on shared resources. A lower price may reward efficient production, or it may reward a narrower responsibility.

Ownership does not settle the difference. Paying for extraction rights transfers income to someone entitled to receive it. It establishes no automatic connection between that payment and the continued availability of useful resources. The deposit may be exhausted while every contractual payment is made correctly. A private financial account can therefore balance during the consumption of an inheritance accumulated long before its owner appeared.

Social capacities create a similar difficulty. An employer benefits from a worker’s education and from institutions that make cooperation dependable. Wages, taxes and public expenditure already distribute many of the associated costs. We should examine those arrangements before asserting that a contribution has been omitted. Where a gap remains, however, it does not disappear because the employment contract is satisfactory to both parties. Productive capacity can deteriorate beyond the firm’s accounts while the firm records a sound return.

Modern economics has extensive tools for studying externalities, resource depletion and future costs. The question is whether the governing measure carries enough of this information into routine decisions. Expectations about the future can enter prices. Whether they protect a capacity depends on information, enforceable rights and whose interests those expectations represent. An anticipated private return differs from an obligation to maintain shared productive conditions.

A useful measure must connect these histories without confusing their meanings. Energy provides a physical account of transformations; money organises claims and choices among people. This is not a proposition to exchange joules by human satisfaction. The task is to identify the resources supporting a product, then assess the maintaining obligations that its ordinary price can leave unpaid. This gives us a basis for comparing producers even when customers value their outputs equally. We can retain what the price tells us while requiring evidence about the productive conditions behind it.

I therefore propose a complementary measure of natural and social capital: the productive potential an activity uses and the contribution it makes towards maintaining that potential. Ordinary prices would continue to organise exchange. The additional account would distinguish a gain earned through better use of resources from income obtained by passing their maintenance to others. Its credibility would depend on observable processes and clear boundaries. A general expression of concern would accomplish little; an obligation needs an identifiable subject and evidence of what fulfilling it requires.

Heat and mechanics became intelligible together when disappearing work and appearing heat entered one energy account, and economic prosperity requires a comparable accounting connection between the gains we exchange and the productive capacities we consume.

References

1. Rumford, B. (1798). An inquiry concerning the source of the heat which is excited by friction. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, 88, 80–102. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstl.1798.0006

2. Joule, J. P. (1850). On the mechanical equivalent of heat. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, 140, 61–82. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstl.1850.0004

3. Lascols, B. (2026). Capital and entropy: Theory of negentropic value (4th ed.). Accounting for externalities.

4. Smith, A. (1904). An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations (E. Cannan, Ed.). Methuen & Co. https://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smWN.html (Original work published 1776)

5. Ricardo, D. (1821). On the principles of political economy and taxation (3rd ed.). John Murray. https://www.econlib.org/library/Ricardo/ricP.html (Original work published 1817)

6. Jevons, W. S. (1888). The theory of political economy (3rd ed.). Macmillan and Co. https://www.econlib.org/library/YPDBooks/Jevons/jvnPE.html (Original work published 1871)