Place a piece of ferromagnetic material in a magnetic field and its internal alignment can change. Remove the field and some magnetisation may remain. Its present state carries a history of what has acted on it. Physicists call this dependence on previous conditions hysteresis. 1 A later intervention must work with the state the material has acquired. Economic change carries a more complicated history, made of investments and political commitments, but it too begins with arrangements already in place.
A factory cannot change its equipment as easily as an analyst changes an assumption. Workers have learned particular trades. Governments rely on revenues, and people organise their lives around services they expect to continue. An account of natural and social capital would alter the basis on which some activities succeed. Implementing it requires institutions capable of helping society make that change and explaining the authority they exercise. The proposed measure should influence decisions, and also ask who maintains its rules and who checks their application. 2
Friedrich Hayek's account of dispersed knowledge gives this question a necessary discipline. Much economically useful knowledge concerns particular circumstances and remains distributed among people. Prices can communicate changes without requiring every participant to know their complete cause. 3 A new standard should draw on this decentralised ability to discover better methods. Its institution needs to establish what must be accounted for while leaving producers room to decide how to improve. No committee could collect every useful observation or choose every workable response on their behalf.
I separate defining the measure from enforcing obligations. A scientific body would maintain valuation rules; another institution would handle control and sanctions. Establishing how a resource withdrawal should be represented differs from deciding whether an agent complied. Keeping the responsibilities distinct helps prevent an authority from changing its own standard while judging someone subject to it. Both bodies would need public reasoning for their decisions, since the separation of tasks cannot itself guarantee that either task is performed well.
Common principles must accommodate differences in conditions. Recovering a material in one place can require more work than recovering it elsewhere. Renewal depends on local circumstances, and social contributions depend on membership and access. Universality means recording such differences coherently. It should allow an advantage arising from a better process while exposing one obtained through an exemption. Local evidence supplies the detail; the common framework lets others understand what the detail means in the account.
Expertise does not remove political choice. Society decides which claims it recognises and what it seeks to preserve. Specialists can investigate a recovery method and reject an unsupported estimate. They cannot derive the legitimacy of a governing institution from the calculation. The people accepting obligations must be able to understand where evidence ends and judgement begins. Otherwise a correct result in a technical dispute could be used to conceal an indefensible allocation of power.
International production makes the boundary particularly difficult. A local requirement can encourage a firm to move its most demanding stages elsewhere. Shared natural resources also cross national jurisdictions. We therefore seek a global reference for their maintenance. This would restrict some existing claims of sovereignty over resources treated as a common inheritance. Governments would have to justify accepting that restriction to their populations. Calling the future institution impartial is insufficient; its design must give people reasons to expect impartial conduct.
Allocation makes the issue concrete. Existing industrial investment creates strong claims for continuity. Living needs create another basis for access. Favouring population or a comparable indicator over current output would change the distribution of transition costs. That choice expresses the view that past resource use should not automatically establish a superior continuing entitlement. An accounting standard can reveal the amounts involved. Public deliberation must still address the distribution and the practical means of adjustment for people affected by it.
Control requires safeguards against capture. I suggest rotating control bodies and votes organised through randomly selected subgroups, making durable collusion harder. I also reject a veto that allows one participant to preserve an advantage indefinitely against a collective decision. These arrangements address the incentives of governors themselves. Rotation must retain competent review and a usable institutional memory. Random selection can disturb an entrenched agreement without ensuring that the next decision will be sound. We should test these mechanisms against the failures they are intended to prevent.
Sanctions also create incentives of their own. Commons governance provides a reason to use a graduated response. Yet temporary exclusion from an accounting system could give an offender a holiday from the obligations it imposes. I therefore favour financial penalties among intermediate sanctions. A penalty must make evasion less attractive while leaving the obligation in force. Clear evidence of noncompliance and a means of examining disputed findings belong alongside it. Environmental urgency cannot make an erroneous charge harmless to the person receiving it.
The common fund needs equally visible limits on its purpose. Supporting measurement and universally available contributions would keep its resources tied to the capital the system seeks to maintain. Particular interests would still have reasons to seek preferential access. Public accounts of spending and results are therefore essential. The administering institution should be able to show what became available through its own use of resources, under the same demand for evidence it places on others.
Learning must continue during implementation. Firms need information before committing capital; workers need to understand what a change means for their abilities and livelihoods. Education includes explaining uncertainty and considering objections. A process that learns can correct a conversion rule or recognise a recovery method performing better than expected. It can also discover that an apparently convenient requirement is too expensive to administer. Preserving the objective should permit these improvements to the means of pursuing it.
I have not established the proposal's empirical validity merely by describing an institutional design. A bounded trial should compare estimates for the same activity, record the cost of obtaining evidence and observe changes in behaviour. Independent assessments of the same material flow would reveal where differences arise from the evidence and where they arise from ambiguous rules; each finding calls for a different correction. It must look for obligations shifted beyond its boundary.
Consistent reporting would be useful, but expansion should depend on evidence that the system helps maintain the capacities it measures. Testing supplies a practical route from an argued principle to rules that deserve wider authority.
As a magnet retains the effects of earlier fields, a credible economic transition must work with inherited arrangements while remaining accountable for the direction in which it changes them.
References
1. Ling, S. J., Moebs, W., & Sanny, J. (2016). University physics (Vol. 2). OpenStax. https://openstax.org/books/university-physics-volume-2/pages/12-7-magnetism-in-matter
2. Lascols, B. (2026). Capital and entropy: Theory of negentropic value (4th ed.). Accounting for externalities.
3. Hayek, F. A. (1945). The use of knowledge in society. The American Economic Review, 35(4), 519–530. https://www.econlib.org/library/Essays/hykKnw.html
