Accounting for Externalities > Economic_theory > What Markets Can Do with Better Accounts

At sea, a ship's course is more useful when the navigator knows where the ship actually is. Celestial navigation connects observations of stars and other bodies with calculations made elsewhere. The first British Nautical Almanac appeared in 1766 with data for 1767, including information for determining longitude through lunar distances. Navigators measured the Moon's angular distance from another celestial body and compared the observation with predictions in the tables. Shared astronomical work helped turn a local observation into a position from which a voyage could proceed. 1

For a trading voyage, a more reliable position gave the crew a basis for checking its course and planning an approach to land. Published tables brought astronomical calculations within reach of mariners who could not have produced them alone aboard ship. This shared work supported the exercise of judgement over a particular voyage, whose cargo and destination remained other decisions. In that case, economic freedom also depends on an ability to locate an activity within conditions beyond its immediate view.

Markets can make demanding comparisons within the information they receive. An enterprise may face relentless competition while receiving an incomplete bill for what it uses. It pays suppliers and employees, yet leaves the maintenance of a shared resource outside the calculation. Its apparent efficiency then includes an unrecorded demand on others. Accounting can disclose that position, while leaving substantial freedom over the methods used to improve it. 2

Friedrich Hayek's argument about dispersed knowledge explains why this freedom matters. Practical information about particular times and places is distributed among people who know different things. A price change can prompt adjustments without explaining every circumstance that caused it. His example of tin becoming scarcer shows how users might economise without receiving a complete account of events elsewhere. The coordinating achievement lies in enabling many local responses to a signal; it does not require one mind to command the whole process. 3

The difficulty is what the signal includes. If damage to a common water supply generates no enforceable obligation, the price of a product may give its buyer little reason to economise that resource. Knowledge exists downstream, where the effects are experienced, yet the people holding it cannot necessarily make it count in the sale. The response is to connect that missing obligation with the producer's calculation. The producer can then use local knowledge to find a less demanding method.

Imagine two firms supplying cloth of comparable quality. One leaves water requiring extensive treatment. The other recirculates more water and pays to maintain the equipment. If the first can leave treatment to the downstream community, it enjoys a private cost advantage. Competition can operate perfectly vigorously on those terms. The resulting price comparison still rewards the transfer of a burden, allowing an unpaid use of shared capacity to resemble superior organisation.

A maintenance obligation changes the comparison. Each firm has to recognise the work required to preserve the productive resource it uses. The more demanding process can be improved, the required maintenance can be provided, or the producer can accept a smaller margin. The recirculating firm gains from a burden already reduced. Nobody has to prescribe one machine for every factory. A common responsibility leaves room for different technical and organisational responses, whose performance can be compared under the same purpose.

Defining that responsibility requires an institution. It must identify the resource and the activity drawing on it, and decide what evidence establishes an effective contribution. Measurements need checking and errors need a route of appeal. These arrangements are part of making the signal useful. If a firm can gain as much by adjusting a declaration as by improving its process, competition will reward the declaration. Trustworthy accounts protect the advantage earned by somebody who has actually reduced the burden.

Local knowledge belongs here too. Elinor Ostrom's work on common resources shows why institutional arrangements must be examined in relation to their setting and users. Successful cooperation cannot be assumed to follow automatically from either private ownership or state control. We can draw from this a practical requirement: people who understand a resource need a role in establishing how its condition is observed and maintained. Where effects travel beyond a locality, coordination must follow them. 4

A manager comparing two suppliers would then receive something more useful than an instruction to be responsible. The account would identify a demand for maintenance and show how it entered the comparison. Different firms could reduce that demand in different ways, while customers retained their own purposes. The shared reference would make the consequences of those choices easier to compare without assuming that every participant possessed the same information.

That wider reach is crucial for supply chains. A firm should not improve its position merely by buying an input whose production has moved the same loss elsewhere. Nor should identical restoration work cancel several different obligations as it passes through contracts. The account has to remain traceable across those transactions. A common standard can support local decisions only if the boundary of responsibility follows the significant effects on shared capital.

Precision itself has a cost. A tiny flow may not justify an elaborate investigation; a major depletion cannot be ignored because it is awkward to measure. We already make comparable judgements when deciding what financial information is material. A societal account needs enough detail to alter consequential decisions, together with access to the underlying evidence. The aim is to make responsible production practicable, including for a smaller firm whose resources for measurement are limited.

The adjustment will also reach households. A product whose affordability depended on unpaid maintenance may cost more once that burden is recognised. People with little room in their budgets will experience the change differently from wealthier customers. Distributing the transition fairly requires political choices about timing and support. A clearer economic signal tells us why an adjustment is needed; it cannot decide alone who should bear it or how quickly they can adapt.

Finally, a financial obligation cannot supply a restoration method that does not exist. Land and equipment may be unavailable; some losses have no compensating operation. The account should expose those limits and direct choices towards avoiding them. Where preservation requires a direct restriction, a favourable transaction price cannot overrule it. Within workable conditions, however, exchange can still mobilise knowledge and invention, rewarding those who find a better way to maintain the capacities they use.

As celestial observations and shared tables helped mariners establish their position without choosing their voyage, reliable accounts can help enterprises navigate their obligations while leaving them room to discover a better course.

References

1. U.S. Naval Observatory. (n.d.). History of The Nautical Almanac. https://aa.usno.navy.mil/publications/na_history

2. Lascols, B. (2026). Capital and entropy: Theory of negentropic value (4th ed.). Accounting for externalities.

3. Hayek, F. A. (1945). The use of knowledge in society. The American Economic Review, 35(4), 519–530. https://www.econlib.org/library/Essays/hykKnw.html

4. Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511807763